INTRODUCTION
One often hears concerns that international judges may run amok, ac expanding international law not based in explicit state consent. There is a lo reality to these concerns. In practice, all judges make law. Indeed, a key reas authority to international courts is because governments know that contrac rt (IC) decision-making find that ICs are more restrained in practice than m international judicial activism fear.
2 Yet this concern is not entirely unfounde interpret international rules in ways that constrain national sovereignty. For governm commentators concerned about such expansive judicial lawmaking, the Eu Justice (ECJ) represents the problem in the extreme.
key substantive and political objectives associated with regional integration. 4 9 It is only a fear of being sanctioned that inhibits the natural tendency of judges to expand the reach and scope of their authority. 10 By contrast, nurture-based explanations assume that judges are conservative by nature. Judges typically apply the law to the case in fairly straightforward and circumscribed of the law and of judicial discretion-is unusual. Special nurturing and nt is needed for judges to become expansionist lawmakers.
erience is a reason to avoid creating independent ICs. 6 This article reinvestigates the lessons of the ECJ to explore how politic international judicial lawmaking. It does so by comparing the ECJ wit cousin-the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ). In 1969, five countries in the A South America imported from Europe the idea of building a common market t supranational institutions-minus an IC. Andean governments later concluded that the absence court undermined the uniform interpretation of and compliance with And they established the ATJ, explicitly modeling its design on its European prede Today, the ATJ is the third most active IC, having issued more than 1 has fewer rulings than the European Court of Human Rights and th is Court of First Instance), but far more than the World Trade Organizati settlement system, the International Court of Justice, or Latin America's other ICsAmerican Court of Human Rights and the Central American Court of Justice The ATJ is active, but it is not activist. In the vast majority of cases, the ATJ to repeat verbatim doctrines developed in earlier rulings. When pro opportunities to make broader interpretations, the ATJ is surprisingly reluctan reach of Andean rules or its own authority.
We investigate the relative influences of nature versus nurture by com years of ATJ and ECJ decision making, periods when the regional organiz both courts had smaller memberships, paring the first 25 ations that created lower trade experience. We show that the ATJ has generally refrained from the sort of expansionist lawmaking designed to arison. First, most t specific design aking. Our s has been placed on cus of international ly to be ist advocacy e state, or the public generally-support such exp independent ICs awmaking that analysis in existing esigned eories of judicial an judges have tside of enjoys the expansively interpreting Andean law. Section III compares the ways in which environmental factors have influenced ATJ and ECJ decision making. Section IV analyzes the implications of this comparison for understanding how political context shapes IC lawmaking. Inasmuch as our data on the ATJ is new and largely unknown, an appendix explains our methodological choices and provides a guide for scholars who wish to investigate the ATJ further.
11 nascent supranational institutions, and volumes. Because the European story is well known, we focus on the Andean promote integration through law that is the hallmark of its European cousin.
Our analysis has three wider implications beyond this regional comp theories of IC lawmaking assume that ICs are by nature expansionist, and tha features of ICs facilitate or hinder this innate tendency to engage in judicial lawm analysis of two identically designed ICs suggests that too much emphasi these formal institutional rules. Second, in contrast to the predominant fo relations theories on government preferences, we argue that ICs are more like expansionist where domestic interlocutors-such as national judiciaries, jur networks, administrative agencies within th ansions. A third broad policy implication of our analysis is that politically can complete international contracts without engaging in expansive judicial l compromises state sovereignty.
Section I defines expansionist judicial lawmaking and situates our scholarship on ICs. The section shows that the ECJ and ATJ are identically d institutions, creating a natural experiment to test "nature" versus "nurture" th decision making. Section II documents the key trends in ATJ lawmaking. Ande mimicked several ECJ doctrines, including direct effect and supremacy. But ou intellectual property disputes-an area in which, as we explain below, the ATJ support of national administrative actors-Andean judges have declined to follow the ECJ by
I. THEORIES OF EXPAN ICIAL LAWMAKING BY INTERNATIONAL
hus all courts disputes.
12 But in main of the court's cial lawmaking as grandizes a efinition a requirement that judges rule against gov conversely, they can that ICs are by ges want to expand judges to expand the law. One group of scholars examines how access rules shape the opportunity to litig urts where private litig xpand the reach and sco utes because tical stage, raising ry sense that other litigants become aware of its existence and in the ckoned with as retation terpretation through ad by demonstrably heory, which ed on ICs assume that judges are expansionist by nature; thus, judicial independence translates into judicial empowerment at the expense of governments. Scholars have asserted that ICs will be less expansionist where states can easily change legal rules and where judicial terms are short or ppointment. 15 Tom Ginsburg adds that judicial lawmaking increases with the eaty or overruling judges the regime.
16 Eric Posner and John Yoo claim that
SIONIST JUD COURTS
All courts are presented with cases in which the law is indeterminate; t clarify vague clauses and fill in lacunae, making law as they resolve specific contrast to gap filling, expansionist lawmaking significantly widens the do authority at the expense of national discretion. We define expansionist judi interpretations that expand the substantive reach and scope of the law and/or ag court's power. We do not to include in our d ernments. ICs can expand the law without ruling against governments; rule against governments without expanding the law.
International law and international relations theories usually assume nature expansionist lawmakers. Building from the implicit premise that jud their own authority, theorists focus on factors that facilitate or hinder the ability of ate, and thus the demand for expansionist rulings. Scholars expect co ants can initiate disputes 13 to be busier and therefore more likely to e pe of international law compared to courts that hear only interstate disp a steady flow of cases… allows a court to become an actor on the legal and poli its profile in the elementa deeper sense that interpretation and application of a particular legal rule must be re a part of what the law means in practice. Litigants who are likely to benefit from interp will have an incentive to bring additional cases to clarify and enforce it. Further, the in or application is itself likely to raise additional questions that can only be answered subsequent cases. Finally, a court gains political capital from a growing caselo performing a needed function.…
14
Another set of scholars builds on the insights of Principal-Agent (P-A) t posits that agents have interests different than principals. P-A studies focus subject to rea number of parties to an agreement and the difficulty of amending the tr and decreases with the ease of exit from 12 Shapiro, 1981: 29. 13 Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter, 2000 , Helfer and Slaughter, 1997 , Hawkins and Jacoby, 2008 Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000: 482. 15 Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001 , Vaubel, 2006 , Stephan, 2002 . 16 Ginsburg 2005. compulsory jurisdiction and private access make ICs less dependent on states and thus inherently mo 17 , and that comparison presents us with a natural experiment that holds constant these design features to success in ultiple les. Both its in domestic terpretation of the ables private actors ecretariat investigates the alleged violation, and, if necessary, files a noncompliance complaint with ly with the court's fuses to raise a 's Cartagena ts prohibit member l treatment for products from other member states, and allow supranational bodies to adopt directly applicable secondary legislation. 20 In both systems, member states set ambitious but politically unrealistic dates for on market. But whereas the ECJ crafted its rulings to overcome political overnments re likely to issue expansionist rulings.
These theories assume that ICs will engage in expansionist lawmaking permissive institutional design features facilitate the extent of such lawmaking. The ECJ-ATJ explore how context shapes judicial behavior.
Andean governments replicated the ECJ's design, hoping to copy its enhancing respect for common market rules.
18 Both the ECJ and the ATJ provide m avenues for challenging government behavior that conflicts with international ru systems contain a preliminary ruling mechanism in which private actors file su courts and national judges refer questions to the ECJ/ATJ for a binding in applicable law. Both systems also contain a noncompliance procedure that en and member states to inform the communities' secretariats about rule violations. The s ECJ/ATJ. In both systems, sanctions can be imposed if a state fails to comp ruling. 19 The Andean system has one additional feature. If the secretariat re noncompliance suit, a private actor can bring the suit directly to the ATJ.
Both courts also interpret similar legal rules. The Andean Community Agreement copies many elements of the Treaty of Rome. Both documen states from creating new barriers to trade, require nationa completing a comm obstacles to integration, the ATJ has not done likewise, even after Andean g modestly expanded its authority and permeability to private actors.
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17 Posner and Yoo, 2005: 6-7 . 18 Keener, 1987: 49. 19 A sanctioning mechanism was added to the European legal system in 1989, after the period of contrast, the Andean system has always allowed for retaliatory sanctions. 20 In the Andean context, changing secondary legislation requires the support of all member unanimity was required during the period we invest our study. By states; in Europe, igate. As of 1989, some secondary European legislation can be changed by a qualified majority vote. 21 Originally, the Andean Junta could only investigate state noncompliance when another member state asked it to do so. In the 1996 Cochabamba Protocol reforms, member states revised the ATJ's founding treaty. Revised Article 25 allows private actors to request the General Secretariat (which replaced the Junta) to request an investigation and to file infringement cases directly with the ATJ. Revised Article 34 explicitly authorizes the ATJ to delve into the facts of preliminary references "when essential for the requested interpretation." Section IV of the Revised Andean Court Treaty also allows private actors to challenge the General Secretariat's failure to act. These changes are revealed by comparing the original Court Treaty (18 Int'l Legal Materials 1203 states have exited from the Andean regime (for reasons unrelated to the ATJ).
Nature-based theories that emphasize institutional design would expect t to be equally expansionist because the two ICs face similar opportunities and co dynamic "nature" type theories would expect judicial lawmaking to vary based o states will adopt legislation to limit the effect an unwanted IC ruling. But they over future expansionist rulings by signaling to an IC that states strongly oppos Dynamic nurture-based theories might expect variations in economic a structural conditions-such as trade levels, whether governments in power the level of diffuse popular support for judges and integration-to affect a lawmaking. 26 We incorporate these dynamic expectations by examining whethe political consensus in support of integration, or changes in trade levels and d expla lawmaking. We conclude that ICs expand the reach and scope of the law not as a result of in response to the encouragement and support of sub-state actors who possess the domestic authority or influence to support compliance with rulings.
II. DOES ACTIVE MEAN ACTIVIST? ECJ AND ATJ LAWMAKIN
was beginning to establish its legal and political authority. Both courts were during these periods, with a steadily increasing diet of preliminary references. 305 noncompliance decisions and 1808 preliminary rulings between 1960 and of 86.1 cases per year), whereas the ATJ, with a geographically and demograph 22 Andean judges serve six year terms, like their European equivalents. Whereas ECJ judges can be reappointed numerous times, ATJ judges can only be reappointed once. Judges on both courts can only be removed for serious misconduct. No effort has been made to remove an ATJ or an ECJ judge. 23 For the ECJ, states amend the Consolidated Treaty on a European Union. For the ATJ, states amend the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement. Both treaties have been amended, but only to expand, not limit, each court's jurisdiction. On changes to the ATJ's jurisdiction, see note 21. 24 Hartley, 1999: 164-5. 25 Maduro, 1998, Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla, 2008. Notwithstanding the large number of cases, European and Andean gove only weakly committed to economic and legal integration during these periods and activists urged the courts to overcome this tegrationist goals. As we explain below, the ECJ responded eagerly to these entreaties whereas the ATJ was more circumspect.
Because so much is known about the ECJ, this section focuses on the A activities have generated surprisingly little scholarship. The ATJ's genesis shares some of these characteristics but not othe announced the suprem before it, the ATJ foundational period (the direct effect of Andean law was presumed). The ECJ developed these 27 ECJ data from (Stone, 2004: p. 72-9) . For ATJ litigation patterns, see Helfer and Alter, 2009, Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich, 2009. 28 The Andean Secretariat website is generally more reliable than the ATJ's website. We accessed ATJ decisions and resolutions here: www.comunidadandina.org/canprocedimientosinternet/procedimientos.aspx 29 This search led us to a number of noncompliance rulings, several of which we analyze below. We did not, however, code all noncompliance rulings. (See Appendix 1). 30 Hoffmann, 1966: 881-95 . 31 Weiler, 1991 Weiler, : 2445 Weiler, -2450 . 32 The ATJ's first preliminary ruling in 1987 involved a Colombian administrative agency's refusal to consider an opposition filed by the car company Volvo to the registration of an allegedly infringing trademark. The complaint doctrines without applying them to the case at hand; the ATJ behaved simila to accept the validity of the state practices in que rly, finding reasons stion.
33 But whereas the ECJ later expanded thes the fraught act institutions rofoundly different.
ned regional ms with production capabilities distributed to lesson unequal growth and pro hese programs moving internal trade rum. Should a ent? Andean law responded by adopting a Janus-faced Free Trade Program that outlawed new barriers to trade and hus came into Cartagena king to reinvigorate the faltering Andean integration project.
37 Soon after its creation, a handful of motivated litigants turned to the court to promote the objectives of the Cartagena Agreement. The first preliminary TJ used the case Costa v. Enel and the obligation of e core legal doctrines, the ATJ has circumscribed them.
To understand the development of ATJ doctrine, we must first explain political context that preceded the creation of the ATJ. Although Andean P resembled their European counterparts, Andean economic policies were p Inspired by the import substitution strategy of Raul Prebisch, the Pact envisio industrial progra mote economic development. 34 But the foreign investment needed to fund t never materialized.
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The Andean Pact also envisioned creating a common market by re barriers. But the lack of progress on import substitution policies raised a conund country be required to open its markets if it did not receive the benefits of industrial developm required the progressive removal of existing barriers but also exempted nearly all economically or politically important products. 36 The ATJ t existence facing a political compromise that blunted the legal aspirations of the Agreement.
The ATJ was established in 1984 as part of a series of reforms see reference was raised by a strong supporter of the Andean legal system. 38 The A to explain how the preliminary ruling process worked and to adopt the ECJ's Simmenthal rulings, which declared the supremacy of European law and potential conflict between Andean and Colombian law. But the ATJ nevertheless used the re the preeminence of Andean law. See ATJ ruling 1-IP-87 (points 2 and 3.5). ATJ decisions are rocedure (IP = ber (e.g. 87)
the groundwork for uential rulings. Alter, 1998: 131-2. 34 Prebisch and Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. 1984; Prebisch and Inter-American Development Bank. 1971Avery and Cochraine, 1973 , French-Davis, 1977 . 35 Dietz and James, 1990: 1-11. 36 Hojman, 1981. 37 Padilla, 1979 , Keener, 1987 , Ferris, 1979 did not raise an actual or case to decla referenced by their case number not by the litigants' names. The letters connote the type of p interpretaciones prejudiciales, N = nulidad, AI = Acciones de Incumpliemeinto). The last num corresponds to the year the case was filed (e.g. 1987) . 33 The ECJ developed key legal doctrines in cases of minor substantively importance, laying future expansions of European law in more conseq national courts to enforce this law.
39 But whereas the ECJ had framed its an constitutional terms, The ATJ's first two preliminary ruli acy, and preemption. As ATJ jurisprudence evolved, however, the court declined to follow later ECJ rulings that expanded them. In the Colo discussed below, for example, the ATJ did not assert that supremacy implies national judges to set aside conflicting domestic law.
A comparison of the two courts' preemption doctrines reveals a any textual support in the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ asserted that in a number of other areas regulated by European law, the ECJ concluded that member states legislating even where there is no Community rule directly on point. These rulings are expansionist because it is the that ECJ determines whether a particular EC rule o See Weiler, 1991 pp. 2413 . For more on the activism involved in these rulings, see : Hartley, 1996 . Commentators have stressed that the ECJ's constitutional framing was an important political move. Maduro, 1998 : 8, Vauchez, 2007 Van Gend en Loos p. 12. 42 The court stated that supremacy "is the essential characteristic of Community Law and a basic requirement for building integration." The ATJ cited 1980 declaration in which member states had agreed that "the legal system of the [Cartagena] Agreement prevails within the framework of its competences over national norms." 1-IP-87 point 2. 43 ling with facts ar to the ECJ's Van Gend en Loos decision. As in that case, the plaintiff claimed market treaty created an immediate bar to increasing tariffs on goods from ers for the community, and it has concluded that states retain the power to sole exception of national laws that directly conflict with extant Community r In a 1990 ruling, the ATJ further cabined the preemption doctrine. A case law to reaffirm that Andean laws can displace national rules, the ATJ also integration is gradual, incremental process that limits the extent to which C preempt national authority: "Especially, when dealing with complex and vast i llectual property, . . . it seems logical that many of these diverse issues, ev be a matter of common regulation in the beginning, are still the compete legislator for an indefinite time until they are effectively covered by the Community norm Other ATJ rulings during the foundational period exhibited even great ATJ allowed states wide autonomy in implementing Andean rules, and it was unhelpful to litigants that turned to the Andean legal system to accelerate the integration process. In 1987, for example, Reynolds Aluminum challenged a Colombian duty o from Venezuela. The ATJ dismissed the complaint because at the time private a expressly authorized to raise noncompliance suits. 48 In 1989 an attorney from C the ATJ to interpret the controversial Andean investment code, 49 which b to allow member states considerable leeway to regulate foreign i uthority to hear the suit and made clear that states could not use domestic Andean obligations. Yet the ruling also recognized the authority of governmen own criteria to decide whether certain economic sectors could be limited to because the government has reserved investment for dom
The Reynolds Aluminum dispute reappeared in 1990 as a preliminary ru strikingly simil that the common 45 On the ECJ's doctrine of implied powers, see : Weiler, 1991 : Weiler, : 2415 55 The ATJ defined the obligations under each as exception and ed which products. ATJ left this key ECJ has a long tradition of reserving to itself the authority to determine the extent of ection to ly Community rules to the facts. Judge Federico Mancini rity to rule on al law violates European law. But "having clarified the meaning of the relevant ber states had free reign with respect to products exempted from the Free purview.
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By refusing to interpret the Cartagena Agreement as an independent source of free trade commitments, the ATJ parted company with Van Gend en Loos. The ECJ ma Rome a constitutional document that created immediately enforceab higher order legal obligations for governments. For Andean judges, by c Cartagena Agreement was not a constitutional charter but only a starting point f that member states were free to amend by enacting Andean secondary legis
The implications of this conclusion became clear in 1993 when Reynold asked the ATJ to review-for a third time-the same Colombian duty on alum the years since the court's earlier ruling, member states had moved Andean law further toward a common market. A series of dates had been set to eliminate the for different countries. There we regime, and noted that the exceptions for the free trade program apply "as long reserve lists exist."
56 But the heart of the issue was which legal regime govern
Rather than selecting the relevant rules from among the three options, the question for national courts to answer.
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The national exceptions to free trade rules. 58 Moreover, ECJ has given significant dir national judges regarding how to app acknowledged that the ECJ formally refrains from "overstepping" its autho whether a nation 52 Saldias, 2007: 12 53 "Member States are independent to decide on burdens and restrictions in relation to reserved or excepted products; the Cartagena Agreement in no case prohibits them from imposing new burdens or granting these products more favorable treatment . . . ." 1-IP-90: conclusion point 1. 54 In a later nullification ruling the ATJ required that changes to the Cartagena agreement be adopted during a "reunion de plenipotenciarios" and not via ordinary secondary legislation. ary to the Andean ic rom the Common 59 Andean states sought to limit the ATJ from guiding the application of national law by at first suggesting that the ATJ could not consider the facts of referred cas that the ATJ can only consider the facts "when essential for the requested hough one can thus find some textual support for the ATJ's reticence, t nevertheless been remarkably reluctant to give prescriptive guidance to national There were a number of ways that the ATJ could have used the aluminu expand its authority and to promote the Andean common market. The court cou planned end of the Free Trade Program's exceptions as a hard date. It could Andean industrial programs preempted national autonomy. It could have d list a part of Andean law and itself determined which goods were included on th have allowed national judges the discretion to decide individual cas ined Andean guidelines for determining the validity of government exem Instead, the ATJ turned the issue over to national cou etermining whether member states were complying with Andean f
Would the ATJ become more expansionist if there were greater polit among Andean member states over building a common market?
ATJ lawmaking during a period of relative political harmony: 1996
In the mid-1990s, the member states re-launched Andean integratio demands of international financial institutions and growing domestic dissatisfac slow pace of economic growth. By this time, the import substitution theory had com epute and the region's governments had decisively embraced the neolibera Consensus 61 and the goal of building a common market. 62 In recognition of this member states reformed Andean institutions, replacing the ineffectual Junta with a Gen lawyers eager By 1996, the ATJ faced a very different political environment. Contr Pact period, there was relative agreement among member states regarding the region's econom philosophy. To be sure, there were still challenges, such as Peru's withdrawal f 59 Mancini, 1989: 606. 60 See note 21. 61 Dezalay and Garth, 2002, Williamson, 1990. 62 O'Keefe 1996. For example, the 1997 Sucre Protocol-a document similar to the European Single European Act-envisioned the phase out of all exceptions to the common market. 63 ine" patents, the United States that or defended the tes, "in their own al] property ance on this seemingly e of the essential instrument" to "promote well-balanced, harmonious, and equal development" in the region. The court then interpreted the e but not a reason to the ATJ cast itself
The ATJ extended this approach in a subsequent decision involving second use patents, another intellectual property right sought by foreign pharmaceutical companies. 70 The plaintiff the World Trade Organization's Agreement an law is supreme even over teral treaties such as those adopted in the WTO: es wanted the ATJ to be more assertive in interpreting and enforcing Andean We see a marked change in the ATJ around this time, especially in its r intellectual property. For reasons we explain elsewhere, the vast majority of A concerns this subject, which has long occupied a central place in Andean integr law seeks to balance intellectual property protection against other social policies such a lth and consumer protection. The ATJ has purposively interpreted Andea balanced approach against external pressures to raise intellectual property prot
In the ATJ's first noncompliance case, a 1996 ruling involving "pipel court reviewed a challenge to a bilateral agreement between Ecuador and the granted additional patent rights to foreign pharmaceutical firms. In addition to its patent rulings, the ATJ developed a large body of judge involving trademarks and the procedures of domestic intellectual pr agencies. I ers against the interests of consumers and those opposing intellectual proper registrations.
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In litigation unrelated to intellectual property issues, by contrast, the sh making was less pron ean rules, in enforcing Andean procedures, and in reviewing the facts of pre references. 73 But it did not issue expansionist rulings that pushed member states levels of legal integration.
The Colombian alcohol monopoly cases illustrate the ATJ's approach d In May 1991, Ecuador complained to the Andean Junta, arguing that municipal concerning the distribution and floor prices for alcohol products impeded comp discriminated against alcohol products exported from Ecuador.
74 Consistent wi the Junta settled the dispute without resolving the underlying problem and wi case to the ATJ. The dispute reappeared after the 1 e Venezuela challenged the Colombian alcohol policy. The Junta adopted legally binding decision that found fault with Colombian municipalities tha against imports in their distribution and pricing policies. 75 The Junta ordered C The ATJ issued its noncompliance judgment six months later. The situat ATJ was remarkably similar to the ECJ's landmark Costa v. Enel decision-wit difference. The Costa v. Enel case was simultaneously referred to the Italia and to the ECJ. The Italian Constitutional Court ruled first, finding that Europe inapplicable to the case at hand and not supreme over national law. 79 The E found that European law was supreme and that national courts were obliged
The ATJ was ruling on a noncompliance suit, although it later received a prelim reference concerning this issue. The more salient contrast is that the Colomb been challenged by two member states and condemned by a GS Resolution.
In the noncompliance ruling, the ATJ went out of its way to agree w Court. It quoted from the court's decision and concurred that there was no i between the alcohol monopoly and Andean law. The impl erent matter, however. Each municipality had set its own rules for selling exporters to apply for multiple licenses to distribute alcohol throughout the cou government had tried to introduce a common system alcohol taxation, but the persisted. The ATJ found that the municipal practices illegally restricted the s products and that Colombia was therefore in violation of Andean law.
The same litigant who had filed the Constitutional Court challenge la Colombian court-the Consejo de Estado-to nullify the municipal policies. This of many attacks on the alcohol monopoly that this court had reviewed. To nullify the law this time, especially after the Constitutional Court ruling, would have been a rad 77 International human rights agreements ratified by Colombia are part of a "bloque de constitucionalidad" which gives them a status superior to than national law. bia was obligated to extend its earlier ECJ's supremacy whatever was t Andean law udges to help it to enforce that law. Although the ATJ did not explain its reluctance to extend suprem the very authority or the uthority or the the Peruvian t the time, i als were eager for guidance as to the to refer cases, it jected the referral, rative agency and cretariat asked the pesticides. The ATJ found that Andean rules req ies, and it called and domestic t left it to the national authorities to determine how to best achieve these ewhat inconsistently, it found that Andean law did not require national agencies 2004, the ATJ expansionist rulings concerning intellectual property but was far less willing to exert its plaint, the Consejo referred the case to the ATJ as required under Andean la
The ATJ issued its preliminary ruling in 1999, reiterating that Colom modify practices that conflicted with Andean law. 81 Yet the ATJ refused to reliance on the European supremacy doctrine. If the ATJ had followed the analysis in Costa v. Enel, it would have instructed the Colombian courts to do necessary to give effect to Andean law. Instead, the ATJ simply declared wha required without asking national j acy, its conclusion is difficult to divorce from real concern that Andean national judges might find that they lacked the legal political will to heed the ATJ's request.
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Two other cases further illustrate the ATJ's unwillingness to expand its a reach of Andean law during this period. In 1999, the administrative tribunal of intellectual property agency INDECOPI attempted to refer a case to the ATJ. A Peruvian courts refused to refer cases, although agency off ci meaning of Andean IP rules. If the ATJ had allowed the INDECOPI tribunal would have greatly expanded its influence in Peru. But the Andean judges re adopting the highly formalist position that the tribunal was part of an administ thus not a "domestic judge" authorized by the ATJ Treaty to refer cases.
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In the second case, from 2003, a former staff attorney of the General Se ATJ to fill in Andean rules regulating the use of uired states to improve the quality of health in rural and agricultural industr for a better administrative procedure, including a registration of both imported pesticides. But the cour goals. And, som to follow any particular pesticide registration procedure.
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In sum, during the period of relative political harmony between 1996 and issued authority outside of that area. and ECJ e of ATJ preliminary indings: Early ATJ tive and supreme ng conflicting domestic legislation. The ATJ has stressed that governm ents, which by laws and has e court has purposively interpreted Andean intellectual property rules to protect the region's balanced to intellectual property protection against external challenges. In these ways, the ATJ r.
er us other ways, however, the ATJ has behaved far more circumspectly than its regional cousin and contrary to the expectations of nature-based theories. The court has stressed that Andean legal commitments are a product of the member states' consent. As a result, where cked new market-oriented initiatives and Venezuela ultimately withdrew f Community in 2006, taking with it a significant portion of the organization's
The political crisis has slowed the filing of noncompliance suits by th however, noticeably affected ATJ preliminary rulings. The bulk of those rulin from Ecuadorian, Colombian, and Peruvian courts that concern narrow, technic Andean intellectual property law. In a few cases outside of intellectual propert enforced clear Andean rules and reaffirmed its established precedents. For exam Ecuadorian contract dispute between two private firms, the court reiterated its law is superior to WTO r ccasionally, the ATJ has been bolder. In a 2005 ruling from Colombia, f eld the supremacy of a GS resolution over domestic regulations adopted late in 2007, the court overturned its earlier refusal to accept referrals from administrativ intellectual property agencies.
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Comparing 25 Years of Expansionist Judicial Lawmaking by the ATJ
The above analysis encompasses ATJ lawmaking across the univers rulings as well as important noncompliance decisions. To summarize our f rulings mostly emulated key ECJ doctrines, making Andean law directly effec to national law and preempting national governments from enacti ents had agreed to these developm all appearances is true. The ATJ has also been willing to enforce clear Andean required national judges give priority to those laws. Perhaps most strikingly, th approach has generally followed in the footsteps of the ECJ as an expansionist lawmake
In num o 85 158-IP-2006 86 The ATJ upheld a GS resolution that refused Colombia's request to defer a tariff. The ATJ found that Colombia violated Andean law when it later ignored the resolution and unilaterally altered the tariff. The ATJ held that the resolution was superior to domestic law, even if it was adopted earlier in time. (115-IP-2005) . 87 14-IP-2007; see note 83 Andean law contains gaps that protect national rules or national discretion, the scrupulously respected that discretion and has eschewed opportunities to expand scope of Andean law. Moreover, the ATJ does not treat the Cartagena Agreem law; indeed its rulings apply Andean secondary legislation instead of seem ATJ has the reach and ent as higher order ingly contradictory Cartagena provisions. This position gives free reign to member states to amend Andean integration.
ss rules, self-interested icial g strated its utility in issue purposive ndize its own oes the court's reticence cab cases that might reliminary rulings erty.
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t has examined ironment, sex disc its rulings [the ECJ] tonomy, to expand s, and to create nd judging." 89 revealed another important difference and for European integration had stalled. The ATJ also developed its key doctrines during its foundational period. But plains these
THE ECJ AND
This section draws upon the literature on ECJ and international adjudication more generally to assess whether existing theories plausibly explain the differences analyzed above. We reject several possible explanations for these patterns, and then develop our own explanation. legislation to reflect the waxing and waning of their collective commitment to Both courts possessed the same potent combination of wide acce litigants, repeat player legal entrepreneurs, and the tantalizing possibility of jud empowerment. Moreover both courts experienced an increase in case filings, providin opportunities to reveal their potential to private litigants. The ATJ has demon intellectual property cases. But when litigants have presented opportunities to rulings in other issue areas, the court has declined to help them or to aggra authority. The ATJ's refusal to be bold hinders spillovers-not only d in the reach and scope of Andean law, it also inhibits litigants from filing contribute to such expansions. It is a striking fact that of the 1338 ATJ p between 1984 and 2007, only 35 involve subjects other than intellectual prop
In contrast to the ATJ, the ECJ is often expansionist. Alec Stone Swee ECJ case law involving three substantive areas of European law-the env rimination, and free movement of goods. He concludes that "through has acted-relatively systematically-to reduce the domain of national au supranational modes of governance to the detriment of intergovernmental mode the conditions for the gradual Europeanization of national administration a Breaking down ATJ lawmaking historically between the two ICs. The ECJ was most expansionist in its foundational period, when the political dem the Andean system overall exhibits little evidence of international judges stepping in when political processes are blocked. What ex striking differences in ECJ/ATJ lawmaking?
III. EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENT LAWMAKING TRAJECTORIES OF THE ATJ
88 Many of these non-IP cases are discussed above. There are 17 additional cases that involve a special tax program for exports to other Andean states that mostly involve a single firm as a repeat player. The legal issues in these cases are narrow and the ATJ's analysis is not particularly noteworthy. See: Helfer and Alter, 2009 89 Stone Sweet 2004: 232 Attorneys trained in the civil law tradition might offer legal culture a arguing that the ECJ adopted a common law method of decision making, while reflect the civil law tradition of its member states. We reject this explanation fo European legal traditions of the 1960s were not fundamentally different from L traditions of the 1990s. All of the EEC's founding members had civil law sys national judges from embracing the supremacy of European law. In addition, as notes, the civil law tradition is often more of folklore than reality; the "traditio evolving, and increasingly courts in Europe and Latin America are moving in the direction of decodification of the law and constitutionalism. A second possibility is that Andean judges faced a greater risk of leg an attack on their jurisdiction as compared to European judges. History doe claim. ECJ rulings of the 1960s advanced radical legal and political ideas s supremacy and the transfer of sovereignty to supranational institutions-ideas leaders of the period vehemently rejected and that engendered numerous pol challenges. But since the ECJ announced its key doctrines in cases in which it ru governments on the facts presented, the only way to reverse the court's doctr would have been to revise the Treaty of Rome-a complex and politically fr Early ATJ rulings also did not compel governments to change their policies. B European colleagues, Andean judge ernments retained discretion in key policy areas. The ATJ also increased the being legislatively overruled by refusing to find that the Cartagena Ag order legal obligations. In sum, both courts avoided rebukes by not requirin change their policy. But we find no evidence that Andean judges' fear of sanc differences in expansive judicial lawmaking. two regions. Alec Stone-Sweet and Thomas Brunell have argued that there is a l relationship between trade volumes and supranational litigation rates that cont expansion o intra-European trade was also relatively small at the EEC's founding, constitu of the member states' GDP. 93 Trade among Andean states increased over the p 90 Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, 2007: 156- 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 2 0 0 3 Avery and Cochraine, 1973: 183, Hojman, 1981. 95 Kuwayama, 2005: 14, Rodríguez Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar, 1999: 96. 96 Out of possible 10, Andean countries often scored 9, and, aside from Peru's dip, mostly remained between 7 and 9 during the period of time we studied. Negative scores reflect a low democracy and a high authoritarianism score. To be clear, we do not assert that a fear of sanctions, economic con instability are irrelevant to our findings. The key question is how contextual fa explain the outcomes we find. We began our research by taking at face value explanation of ECJ expansionism. If we remove ains are patterns that can be explained by a single logic: both courts engage in expansionist lawmaking where they are actively supported by interlocutors with the power to facilitate state compliance.
A first common pa e doctrines by ruling for national governm on the facts. This was a prudent move for both nascent courts, neither of w the domestic political support needed to ensure compliance with rulings that dire with extant government policies.
A second pattern is that the ATJ engages in expansionist lawmaking in property cases, whereas the ECJ is an expansionist lawmaker in multiple issue a explains this distinction? Only for intellectual property is the ATJ actively supp interlocutors-domestic intellectual property agencies. One cannot observe thi coding ATJ rulings b olving agency patent and trademark decisions. But our interviews revealed t are the ATJ's most enthusiastic interlocutors and compliance constituencies. T that cases be referred to the ATJ given the very limited intellectual property expertise of national remained on the books.
98
These two patterns led us to revisit understandings of the ECJ's legal rev Burley and Mattli offer the canonical nature-based explanation of the ECJ transformation. They explained ECJ lawmaking by arguing that the ECJ quite naturally sought 97 Democratic instability perhaps explain why Bolivia and Venezuelan courts tend to refer very few cases to the ATJ, and why Peru did not become a more active legal participant until much later, though not why Ecuadorian courts have been among the strongest participants in the Andean legal system. See Helfer and Alter, 2009b. 98 We analyze this relationship between the ATJ and national IP agencies in greater depth elsewhere, finding that the ATJ has catered to preferences of national IP agencies in its substantive development of the law. We also show that ATJ oversight has helped the agencies to rebuff pressures from the United States and multinational firms for stronger intellectual property protection rules even where national governments yielded to such pressures. Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich 2009: 22-34. empowerment, and they observe that the lawyers, law professors, and nati coalesced around the ECJ's doctrinal advances were also self-serving, since t empowered by these developments. The ATJ, by contrast, cannot count on domestic judicial support. The Co Constitutional Court, arguably the region's most powerful and authoritative follows a narrow view of Andean law's supremacy. Ecuadorian, Peruvian and we interviewed remain ambivalent and confused about their obligations under National judicial reticence is not a categorical barrier t vent national courts that refuse to refer cases by filing noncom directly with the GS and then the ATJ. As a practical matter, however, the reti judges denies the ATJ a key source of legal and political leverage.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider why legal activists and coalesced behind the European integration process whereas Andean integration set of supporters.
106 What is important is our finding that ICs are more likely to judicial lawmakers when they expect support from key sub-state actors. For rlocutors were the lawyers, judges, academics, and sympathetic governme participated in European law legal associations. For the ATJ, the key interlocuto IP agencies. Once these actors were on board, the two courts could be reasonabl rulings would be respected regardless of the position of the executive or legisla
In sum, we argue that ICs are more likely to be expansionist lawmaker supported by a set of powerful sub-state actors, be they national judges who rulings, agencies who implement the rulings in their administrative practices who will work to promote legislative compliance. We stress the support of subchange conflicting national policy. IC lawmaking can thus promote the spirit rules while sub-state actors mobilize. The next section considers the implicati
IV. CONCLUSION: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF IC LAWM
This article has analyzed judicial lawmaking by the ATJ and ECJ du five years that each court was interpreting and applying its respective common m rules. The different trajectories of two structurally identical courts allows us to r version of the nature-based arguments and arrive at a position that is more consi latest scientific findings in the nature/nurture debate.
Our broadest claim is that international judges are more likely to b lawmakers when they are supported by influential sub-state interlocutors and co constituencies. These intermediaries include national judges, administra groups who have a personal, professional or ideological stake in promoti international rules. The implication of these insights are potentially far reach comparison between the ATJ and EC ecome expansive mpliance tive agency officials, and ng respect for ing. This J suggests that ICs need not pander to executive or legi allying with key state actors s of international racies may be more greater ability to tries in transition, rawing on g nature-based development of the domains of etworks who e sympathetic sub-state acto the ECJ's early on, combined with the ld give pause to ansion.
clusions. But it does redirect our attention to where, when, why, and to what effect sub-state actors build connections to international legal systems. A specific application of this broader question is to ICs to further their objectives. We suspect that more ICs wil e. The ATJ may not n Andean rule of the world. primarily reflects differences in the rate of applications for intellectual property of the substantive concentration of preliminary references, and because cros in references is highly affected by variations in intellectual property app believe that regression analysis rights. Because s-national variation lications, we do not of reference patterns would yield useful insights for our dep in preliminary hould apply the law to ns of specific easons, one cannot conduct the type of analysis und decision to the facts of the several t our interviews and coding of preliminary rulings suggested were politically salient. Although one could further investigate these cases, we not believe such an investigation would not change the main findings of this paper. We probed multiple interviewees and found no evidence that, outside of intellectual property disputes, the ATJ was an active lawmaker in noncompliance cases. endant variable.
Unlike in Europe, Andean governments rarely offer observations references, and ATJ rulings provide scant clues as to how national judges s the facts. Instead, preliminary rulings contain mainly abstract interpretatio provisions of Andean law. For all of these r ertaken by Carrubba et. al (2008) as they probed for state influence over ECJ making in preliminary rulings.
ATJ noncompliance rulings are different in that the ATJ speaks directly case, and the government's positions are more clearly developed. We analyzed noncompliance decisions tha ents and the nization 52 (1):125-152.
an International ding Delegation. orary Problems 71:37-76.
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